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Abstract: Will future lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS), or 
‘killer robots’, be a threat to humanity? The European Parliament has 
called for a moratorium or ban of LAWS; the ‘Contracting Parties to 
the Geneva Convention at the United Nations’ are presently discussing 
such a ban, which is supported by the great majority of writers and 
campaigners on the issue. However, the main arguments in favour of a 
ban are unsound. LAWS do not support extrajudicial killings, they do 
not take responsibility away from humans; in fact they increase the abil-
ity to hold humans accountable for war crimes. Using LAWS in war 
would probably reduce human suffering overall. Finally, the availability 
of LAWS would probably not increase the probability of war or other 
lethal conflict—especially as compared to extant remote-controlled 
weapons. The widespread fear of killer robots is unfounded: They are 
probably good news. 
Keywords: killer robot, LAWS, LAR, AWS, drone, robotic weapon, au-
tomated warfare, responsibility, distinction, proportionality, just war, 
humanitarian law, Geneva convention, regulation, utility 
1. Definition 
The autonomous robotic systems that are the subject of this paper would be able to 
select and attack targets without intervention by a human operator. While the initial 
command to attack would be given by a human, the robot then has a degree of au-
tonomous ‘choice’ for its actions. 
Some examples of systems that fall under the scope of this paper are automated 
radar-guided gun systems to defend ships that have been in use since the 1970ies (e.g. 
the US ‘Phalanx’ Close-In Weapon System). Current versions can autonomously 
                                                            
* The policy recommendations of this paper are spelled out in (Müller and Simpson 2014); the 
philosophical points about responsibility are discussed in detail in (Simpson and Müller 
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identify and attack oncoming missiles, rockets, artillery fire, aircraft and surface vessels 
according to criteria set by the human operator. Similar systems exist for tanks, e.g. 
the Russian ‘Drozd’ (1977-82) and now ‘Arena’ or the German ‘AWiSS’/’AVePS’ 
(Active Vehicle Protection System) by Diehl, which has a reaction time below 400ms. 
The main reason for not having a ‘human in the loop’ in these systems is sheer speed. 
Systems with a higher degree of autonomy would include drones, e.g.: “The 
United Kingdom Taranis jet-propelled combat drone prototype can autonomously 
search, identify and locate enemies but can only engage with a target when authorized 
by mission command. It can also defend itself against enemy aircraft” (Heyns 2013, 
§45). The US X-47B drone can take off and land on aircraft carriers (demonstrated in 
2014); it is set to be developed into an ‘Unmanned Carrier-Launched Surveillance 
and Strike’ (UCLASS) system. It is now quite conceivable that an autonomous drone, 
perhaps with the size and appearance of a bird, could be commanded to locate (e.g. 
using cell phone signal), pursue and kill an individual person—rather like a ‘hit man’. 
In a few years, some states will have the ability to deploy such a killer drone anywhere 
in the world, for example against someone they consider a ‘terrorist’. 
While autonomous air systems are fairly advanced, these kinds of systems will 
shortly also be available on land, on water and under water, as well as in space. For 
example, the US Navy has developed and tested small ‘swarm boats’ that can accom-
pany a ship, and protect it from small vessel attacks by detecting and swarming 
around such vessels—the current version has a ‘human in the loop’ for weapons fire 
(Smalley 2014). 
1.1. Problem 
Robotics in warfare will be a major change, comparable to the introduction of planes 
or perhaps even nuclear weapons (Singer 2009b: 179, 203). One of the questions is 
whether the use of robotics, especially highly autonomous robotics, constitutes just 
one major step in the arms race, or whether it is a step that introduces qualitatively 
new ethical concerns. Many authors and organisations have claimed that killer robots 
are a serious threat to humanity and should be banned, while others have said there is 
nothing new here (Arkin 2009, 2013). As the UN Rapporteur says in his careful and 
detailed report: “Some argue that robots could never meet the requirements of inter-
national humanitarian law (IHL) or international human rights law (IHRL), and that, 
even if they could, as a matter of principle robots should not be granted the power to 
decide who should live and die. These critics call for a blanket ban on their develop-
ment, production and use” (Heyns 2013, §31). 
I agree that LAWS pose new problems and therefore recommend that they must 
meet special technical standards of reliability, esp. with respect to ‘distinction’ and ‘pro-
portionality’, and that their manufacturers and users abide by legal standards that allow 
allocation of responsibility. 
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In this policy paper, I provide a general recommendation on the issue whether 
killer robots should be banned, concluding that they should not. I do so by providing 
a concise survey of the relevant moral concerns. 
1.2. Terminological note  
The UN now uses ‘LAWS’, for ‘Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems’ (Simon-Michel 
2014), and I follow this, despite its unfortunate positive connotations. The weapons 
concerned are also often called ‘LARs’ (lethal autonomous robots; e.g. (Heyns 2013); 
simply ‘drones’ (European Parliament 2014); ‘killer robots’ (www.stopkillerrobots.org); 
‘robotic weapons’ (Leveringhaus and Giacca forthcoming 2014); or ‘unmanned sys-
tems’. I think that the systems concerned are not just lethal in their effects but made to 
be lethal, i.e. they are weapons, so ‘LARs’ is insufficiently precise. ‘Drones’ is too nar-
row, since we are not only talking about flying systems, and too broad, since present 
drones are remote-controlled (‘remote-piloted’). ‘Unmanned’ is sexist, but in any case 
the distinguishing feature here is not whether the human in control is actually inside 
the system (e.g. the plane) or controlling it from a remote location (as with current 
‘drones’), but whether the system has a degree of autonomy. For this reason ‘autono-
mous weapon system’ (AWS) could be an option, but it is not used. ‘Killer robots’ is 
apt in that it implies autonomy and is not limited to air systems; while perhaps over-
dramatic, it makes explicit the moral issue at stake. So I use it together with ‘LAWS’, 
acknowledging the limitations of both terms. 
1.3.  Simple slogans 
A discussion about weapons, killing, suffering and war often generates heated ex-
changes and reduction to simple slogans. Slogans may be useful campaigning tools, 
but do not address the deep moral issues. To forestall misunderstanding, some imme-
diate qualifications are in order. Despite the provocative title, I agree that killing and 
wars are a great evil. More weapons are generally bad, too; they increase the proba-
bility of killing and they are usually an inefficient use of resources. I am also deeply 
concerned about the current use of drones for extrajudicial killings (see Melone and 
Koch, this volume, and (Enemark 2014)), and about the importance of civilian gun 
control (Müller 2015). 
1.4. Structure of the paper 
After an abbreviated look at the current technical and policy situation, I discuss the 
four main arguments in this debate: whether LAWS are inherently wrong because a) 
they violate humanitarian law, or b) they make it harder or impossible to assign re-
sponsibility for killings in war; and whether the consequences of LAWS are good or bad 
in the long run—either c) by increasing or decreasing the suffering of war or d) by 
making war more or less likely. I conclude with a number of policy recommendations. 
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2. Current situation 
2.1. Technological 
It is clear that increasingly autonomous weapons are coming. The first systems that 
make simple ‘attack’ decisions are already in use (see 1.1 above). Remote-controlled 
air systems have been used extensively, especially in the asymmetric Pakistan ‘drone 
war’. Remote-controlled water, underwater and ground systems are also in use or 
close to deployment (see e.g. Singer 2009a). Meanwhile, autonomous driving and sail-
ing systems are at a high level of technological readiness, being tested outside the lab 
(Smalley 2014). The 2013-2038 ‘Unmanned Systems Integrated Road Map’ of the 
US Department of Defense (US Department of Defense 2013) foresees increasing 
levels of autonomy in air/land/sea systems in the coming 25 years. The funding for 
such systems is massive. Taking the US only, the Department of Defense is currently 
spending ca. $5 billion US per year on ‘unmanned systems’ (US Department of 
Defense 2013: 3), as well as an unknown amount of DARPA’s $3 billion US per year 
budget. Further US sources cannot be ruled out. While the US is the world leader in 
military technology with spending on its military ca. 40% of the world’s defence 
spending (ISS 2014), other countries are certainly pursuing automated technologies, 
notably Russia and China.   
The enabling technology for autonomous AI is developing apace. The median es-
timate of probability moving over 50% for high-level machine intelligence with full 
human abilities is 2040, according to a recent survey of expert opinion (Müller and 
Bostrom 2016). Even if these estimates turn out to be excessively optimistic, significant 
autonomy levels in target selection and attack will clearly be possible in the next dec-
ade already. 
Killer robots are attractive to the military, and thus political funding, for a num-
ber of reasons: They reduce the risk to one’s own soldiers, reducing the human and 
political costs of war. They can be cheaper than human soldiers in the long run, not 
needing a salary, pension, housing, food or hospitals, etc. They can also outperform 
humans and human-controlled systems, especially in terms of speed, accuracy and 
ability to function without rest. They can function in environments where human re-
mote-control is not an option (e.g. under water). 
2.2. Policy 
Some states, notably the USA, have developed initial policies for LAWS that include a 
moratorium on systems that do not have a ‘human in the loop’. However, these poli-
cies can be changed any time, at the discretion of these states. Indeed, this possibility 
is explicitly stated in the US policy: “Autonomous … weapons systems shall be de-
signed to allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human 
judgment over the use of force.” (US Department of Defense 2012: 2) 
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Current armed unmanned systems deploy lethal force only in a fully human-
operated context for engagement decisions. … As technology advances and more 
automatic features are introduced, DoD will continue to carefully consider the 
implications of autonomy in weapon systems to ensure safe and reliable opera-
tions and minimize the probability and consequences of failures that could lead to 
unintended engagements. For this reason, DoDD 3000.09, Autonomy in Weapon 
Systems, mandates a policy review before entering formal development for pro-
posed weapon systems that would use autonomous capabilities in a novel manner. 
(US Department of Defense 2013: 24) 
The UK is working on the matter: “The pace of technological development is accel-
erating and the UK must establish quickly a clear policy on what will constitute ac-
ceptable machine behaviour in future; there is already a significant body of scientific 
opinion that believes in banning autonomous weapons outright,” (Ministry of Defense 
2011).  
An independent policy report from the University of Birmingham on “The Secu-
rity Impact of Drones” has come out in October 2014 and it recommends a ban on 
LAWS, since they “fail the test of the ‘laws of humanity and the requirements of the 
public conscience’” and “it is unclear where responsibility would lie for any unlawful 
actions by weaponised robots would lie”. The report also cites UK politicians saying 
“the UK’s position on not wishing to develop such weapons is absolutely clear.” 
(Birmingham Policy Commission 2014: 64, 65).  
3. Moral arguments 
The arguments against killer robots fall into two broad categories: principled ones 
concerning rights and responsibility, and utility considerations deriving from the likely 
consequences of their use. 
3.1. War crimes & international law 
Killer robots, like any weapon in war, must comply with the regulations of Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law in the Geneva Convention. If they cannot, they are illegal 
weapons and their use in war (in bello) constitutes a war crime. Their use outside a war 
is a crime in any case (details in Emmerson 2014). There are two pertinent require-
ments. They must comply with the principle of distinction, i.e. have the ability to discrim-
inate combatants from non-combatants. The legal use of LAWS would thus require a 
positive identification of enemy soldiers, tanks, airplanes, etc. With present technolo-
gy, this will possible only in some situations. In particular, building LAWS’ capable of 
identifying major weapons platforms such as tanks or submarines as military targets is 
likely to be relatively feasible, while building those capable of identifying individual 
humans as either combatant or non-combatant is likely to be very difficult for some 
time.  
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The other pertinent Humanitarian Law principle is the principle of proportionality, 
which requires that damage to civilians is proportional to the military aim. Again, 
current technology for robots can make some defensible judgments on this issue. 
There is an important exception to this, however, notably in cases where a system 
could confirm that no collateral damage was likely. In practice, judgments of propor-
tionality could be made by the commander, in the process by which they specify the 
domain within which a killer robot would operate. A current example is the process of 
authorisation of the ship defence system ‘Phalanx’. The relevant commander sets the 
system to ‘weapons free’ only in conditions where there is near-certainty that fast-
flying missile-like objects are hostile and therefore legitimate targets. The same pro-
cess applies for more potent weapons systems. A descendent technology of the Preda-
tor could be given an area of ocean which a commander has good reason to believe 
will be occupied only by the enemy’s navy, and given ‘weapons free’ to attack targets 
within that. The proportionality requirement would thus be met.  
The United Nations has recently urged member countries to “ensure that any 
measures taken or means employed to counter terrorism, including the use of remote-
ly piloted aircraft, comply with their obligations under international law, including the 
Charter of the United Nations, human rights law and international humanitarian law, 
in particular the principles of distinction and proportionality;” and asserted “… the 
urgent and imperative need to seek agreement among Member States on legal ques-
tions pertaining to remotely piloted aircraft operations;” (United Nations 2013, 6s, 
17). The European Parliament is more forthright and says “drone strikes outside a 
declared war by a state on the territory of another state without the consent of the 
latter or of the UN Security Council constitute a violation of international law and of 
the territorial integrity and sovereignty of that country;” (European Parliament 2014, 
principle E). Some, notably the US President, have disagreed, and claim wider rights 
to self-defence (cf. Schmitt 2014). 
Given this context, it is unfortunate that the UN Special Rapporteur on extraju-
dicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns, reported on LAWS at the 
same time. The normative issues raised by cross-border targeted killings are one thing, 
those by the use of LAWS are quite another. In addressing the question whether a 
killing is extrajudicial, it is irrelevant whether the weapons concerned are used direct-
ly, controlled remotely, or function autonomously. In any case, Heyns, who calls for a 
moratorium, admits that “While it is not clear at present how LARs [lethal autono-
mous robots] could be capable of satisfying IHL [International Humanitarian Law] 
and IHRL [International Human Rights Law] requirements in many respects, it is 
foreseeable that they could comply under certain circumstances, especially if used 
alongside human soldiers.” (Heyns 2013: 109) 
This discussion is clouded by a simple dichotomy of autonomous vs. non-
autonomous systems. To the contrary, autonomy is a matter of degree and is relation-
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al, i.e. something is autonomous with respect to something else, to some degree (cf. 
Müller 2012). The vague nature of autonomy has the awkward implication for propo-
nents of a ban that it would be very hard to formulate clear controllable criteria for 
establishing which systems count as killer robots (cf. Anderson and Waxman 2013). 
There is no deep mystery here. The legal situation is clear enough. Weapons that 
violate the laws of distinction and proportionality in war are already prohibited. Just 
like any other weapon, killer robots should be used only if doing so is in compliance 
with the law; otherwise their use is a war crime. But there is no principled reason to 
suppose that killer robots could not conform to the requirements of distinction and 
proportionality. Whether or not they will do so is an empirical question. Contrary to 
popular belief (e.g. Garcia 2014; Sharkey 2008a; Sharkey 2008b, 2012), this is not an 
argument to ban killer robots. 
It would be an argument only if autonomous killer robots had some feature that 
would make the prosecution of illegal killings difficult or impossible. Some have sug-
gested that this is the case: “Nobody is responsible for the killing”, they say. This ob-
jection deserves more detailed analysis, to which we now turn. 
3.2. Responsibility 
3.2.1. The Responsibility Gap 
The application of criminal law requires that someone be in the dock. This require-
ment, along with a platitude about the relation between law and morality, generates a 
serious problem for the justiciability of LAWS. This section sets out the problem. The 
next summarises how to resolve it. 
For the most part, law ‘piggy-backs’ on morality. That is, many legal ascriptions of 
responsibility do and should track moral responsibilities which are in an important 
sense prior to the law. For instance, the law should define legal responsibility for mur-
der in ways that ensure the conviction of only those people who have committed the 
moral wrong of murder.  
The problem for killer robots then arises given the following two premises. First, 
prima facie, it will be possible for people to be very seriously wronged as a result of 
LAWS’ action. People who should not be killed—such as civilians, or surrendering 
soldiers, or prisoners of war—may well be. The moral wrong is of such a degree that 
there ought to be laws that hold as legally responsible those who are morally responsi-
ble for those deaths. A war cannot be waged justly if no-one could be morally and 
legally held accountable for such serious wrongings. 
Second, however, it is far from clear who is morally responsible for deaths caused 
by LAWS. Recall that LAWS are designed to be autonomous; that is, to be able to 
select targets and make ‘decisions’ to kill people without human input. So who is to 
blame when killer robots get it wrong? It is not clear that the military commander 
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who deployed the system is blame; they were just given the equipment and given the 
order to use it. Nor is it clear that the robot’s designers are to blame. They were 
commissioned to make something that is autonomous; it is a sign precisely of the suc-
cess of their work that the system is able to do so. Finally, nor is it the dumb robot. 
The ability to take on ethical responsibility and be an appropriate target for reward 
and punishment is a complicated matter that involves at a minimum having goals and 
desires, the ability to reflect on these, to act against one’s desires, and to understand 
the consequences of ones’ actions (which is why we usually do not hold small children 
or animals responsible for their action). It is clear that current systems do not have the 
necessary properties for responsibility and that, for the foreseeable future, artificial 
systems will not acquire them—so we do not need a ‘machine ethics’ in that sense (on 
this issue, see Gunkel and Bryson 2014).  
As Rob Sparrow puts it, killer robots threaten to create a ‘responsibility gap’. Yet 
it is a condition of the possibility of a Just War that such gaps not exist  (Sparrow 
2007; the concept derives from Matthias 2004). This ‘responsibility ascription prob-
lem’ is recognised as a large issue in robotics (on which (see Lichocki et al. 2011); for 
recent papers in the philosophy in technology (see Battaglia et al. 2014), also Saxon in 
this volume). As such, killer robots ought not to be used in war. So they ought not to 
be used at all.  
3.2.2.  Living with responsibility gaps 
I deny the thesis that the existence of responsibility gaps morally precludes the use of a 
technology. The claim is not true in civil life, nor is there reason to think it true in 
war. Consider the former first. Even in matters of life and death, such as pharmaceu-
ticals or building bridges, we only expect ‘due care’ from those involved (engineers, 
public inspectors, users, …) and we specify regulations to ensure that the standards of 
due care are high. But, if such care is exercised, we do not require that there be no 
deaths. A certain engineering ‘tolerance’ is accepted, even if we try to keep this as 
small as practically possible. Within that tolerance we expect the bridge to function 
correctly, assuming certain environmental conditions. But if these careful estimates 
were wrong, e.g. we face a stronger earthquake than could be expected, we say that 
the collapse of the bridge and thus the deaths caused are ‘accidental’: Nobody is re-
sponsible. Likewise for drugs. There is net benefit in having effective drugs. Drugs are 
licenced and prescribed, even though we know that there is a risk that some patients 
will suffer from serious unintended side-effects of taking them. This is unavoidable due 
to the biochemical complexity of humans, and the unpredictability for individuals of 
the introduction of novel compounds. The benefit of having effective drugs, even with 
occasional negative side-effects, is shared collectively. It is also enjoyed by individuals 
ex ante, who expect in anticipation to gain benefit from taking the drug, even granting 
the risk of negative side-effect.  
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When a system fails within conditions inside those it should successfully tolerate, 
someone is responsible. In the bridge case, a driver may be responsible for its collapse 
if she takes a lorry over it that is heavier than the load it was designed and stated to be 
able to bear. Or it may be the engineer who is responsible, for cutting costs by using 
inferior materials or just being negligent. It could be the public official responsible for 
confirming compliance with the appropriate regulations. But, importantly, it is con-
ceptually possible that the bridge collapse and no-one is responsible. Suppose the bridge 
crosses a river, which is usually 2m in depth and in the last 200 years has never had a 
volume of water exceeding a depth of 5m. But exceptional floods mean that a depth of 
8m of water is pressing against the pier, which collapses. It would have been a misuse 
of resources to build the bridge to withstand that force; if the same margins of error 
were applied to bridge-building generally, it would be inefficient. In such a case, no-
one is responsible for the bridge’s collapse. If this is correct, the real problem is not the 
possibility that things may go wrong in a way that no-one is responsible. Rather, it is 
how to regulate the tasks of the maker and of the users of the system, in such a way 
that responsibility is usually but not always ascribable. Further, it is unclear what reason 
there would be to make special demands for technologies used in war. There is a re-
sponsibility gap, but this is the normal gap that we accept in engineering. (This argu-
ment is developed at length in (Simpson and Müller forthcoming).) So, what I need 
for my argument here is only the thesis that if a technology produces rare cases of 
killings where no person is responsible, this do not by itself compel us to ban the use of 
this technology. A strong responsibility principle that allows no responsibility gaps at 
all is untenable in practice. However, responsibility gaps are clearly undesirable and 
would rule out systems that systematically or even just frequently produce such cases. 
I argue that killer robots can be regulated in such a way that they do not produce 
more responsibility gaps, but rather reduce their frequency: It is already the base that 
for many killings in war responsibility cannot be allocated.  
3.2.3. Narrowing the responsibility gap 
The responsibility framework outlined above shows how responsibility should be as-
cribed for many of the wrongful killings that could be committed by killer robots. The 
technology gives rise to a related and further beneficial effect, which is often not not-
ed.  Holding someone accountable for their action, e.g. for actual conviction for a war 
crime requires reliable information—which is often unavailable. The ability to acquire 
and store full digital data records of LAWS’ action and pre-mission inputs allows a 
better determination of the facts, and thus of actual allocation of responsibility, than is 
currently possible in the ‘fog of war’. As well as allowing allocation of responsibility, 
the recording of events is also likely to diminish the likelihood of wrongful killings. 
There is already plenty of evidence that, for example, police officers who have to vid-
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eo their own actions are much less likely to commit crimes. So, killer robots would 
actually reduce rather than widen responsibility gaps. 
3.2.4. Regulation and standards 
The foregoing has the following implication: moral interest should be focused on the 
determination of the technical standards of reliability which robots—including killer 
robots—should meet. The recent EU ‘RoboLaw’ report makes a parallel point, in 
arguing that we should resist the urge to say that ‘robots are special’ in terms of re-
sponsibility. Rather, we should adopt a functional perspective and see whether the 
new technology really does require new legal regulation, and in which areas (based on 
Bertolini 2014; Palmerini et al. 2014: 205f). This seems to be a move in the right di-
rection: We already devise automated systems (e.g. automated defence of ships against 
air attacks) where the ‘rules of engagement’ are put into software. The same ‘due care’ 
is to be expected for the manufacture and use of LAWS. Just like for civil autonomous 
cars, we need to specify standards that LAWS manufacturers must abide by. These 
standards must ensure that the robot acts according to the principles of distinction 
and proportionality (this is already possible now if one thinks of targeting tanks, ships, 
planes or artillery, for example). Both manufacturing and distributing LAWS that do 
not abide by these standard would be a war crime. If a killer robot is manufactured 
with due care according to these standards but commits a war crime, due to use in 
situations for which it was not designed or licensed, the crime is the responsibility of 
the soldier/user. The responsible person for a particular command or action can be 
identified in the military chain of command – this is a deeply entrenched tradition. 
Finally, if the soldiers can show that they exercised due care, then the deaths are acci-
dents.  
Regulation of LAWS thus requires two components. First, there are the technical 
standards of reliability which LAWS must meet; pertinently, what degrees of reliabil-
ity LAWS must meet in terms of distinction and proportionality in their decisions to 
attack. Second, there are the legal instruments by which accountability is to be exer-
cised over those who fail to manufacture, distribute or deploy LAWS in accordance 
with those standards. Each dimension—that of technical standards and of law—
should be subject to enforcement at the international and national levels. 
 The proposed policy structure can thus be schematically presented as a ma-
trix: 
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Legal and technical regulation 
 International National 
Legal International Humanitarian 
Law 
Criminal Law 
Technical Technical standards for per-
formance 
Control regimes for technical standards; 
special standards 
 
3.3. Are killer robots good for us? 
Assuming there is no particular ethical problem with humanitarian law or responsibil-
ity, the remaining question is whether the consequences of LAWS are good overall, in 
the long run—do they reduce or increase human well-being? If utility is reduced by 
the existence and use of these weapons we should not allow them. There are two sub-
ordinate questions here. Do LAWS increase or decrease the suffering and loss of war? 
Do LAWS make war more or less likely? 
3.3.1. Reducing the human cost of war 
There are a number of points that suggest LAWS would reduce the human cost of 
war. 
• Robots reduce war crimes and crimes in war: they do not rape, do not get 
angry or afraid, they do not intentionally commit war crimes—unless pro-
grammed to do so. They follow orders more closely. 
• “One of the great arguments for armed robots is they can fire second,” Jo-
seph W. Dyer, cited in (Markoff 2010) 
• Drones are excellent data-collectors, so perpetrators of war crimes are more 
likely to be caught. This also makes war crimes less likely 
• Fewer deaths, injuries and traumas of combatants 
• Fewer deaths, injuries and traumas of non-combatants 
• Thus less damage to future generations 
3.3.2. Making war worse 
There are a couple of points that suggest LAWS would make wars worse: 
• LAWS have limited judgment and common sense, which will lead to errors 
and to carrying out orders that violate the law of war. 
• Killing is made easier if the command can be passed on to an autonomous 
system, so proportionality is under threat. 
3.3.3. Making war more likely 
There are some points that suggest LAWS would make wars more likely: 
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• With LAWS, a war can be expected to result in less death and injury to the 
soldiers on the side that has them available (but only slightly, if compared to 
remote-controlled systems). 
• They make wars less bad, generally, and thus wars are more likely to be cho-
sen as a means. 
• They make a particular military action easier to decide for a military com-
mander (see Krishnan 2009). 
• Fewer losses of soldiers’ lives reduce the political hurdle for wars and esp. 
military action short of war. 
• Finally, they make it easier to maintain a ‘low level’ war for some time, espe-
cially if it is an asymmetric war. 
3.3.4. Utility, fairness and arms races 
The reasons why LAWS make a war more likely apply equally to remote-controlled 
weapons; in fact they apply to any weapon that acts at a distance. Such weapons have 
always resulted in relative safety for the first users: Goliath probably thought David’s 
sling unfair; the Lateran Council of 1139, Canon 29, banned use of the large cross-
bow [ballista] and archery against fellow Christians. The criticism that LAWS lower 
the risk for attackers and thus make wars and other killings more likely is thus correct, 
but applies to any weapon that the one side has, but the other does not: In other 
words, it is the result of an on-going arms race. As soon as the other side has acquired 
the new weapon, the risk of war goes down again. 
This is not to say that I think LAWS are part of an unstoppable arms race. Some 
weapons systems have been banned (anti-personnel mines, chemical weapons) and 
with nuclear weapons the arms race is highly controlled. We can stop developing these 
weapons—the question is whether it is right to do so, given that they seem to save 
lives. 
Let us note that the reasons why LAWS make wars less bad do not apply to all 
weapons at a distance. This is so especially for weapons of mass destruction or weap-
ons with poor accuracy—and thus with poor compliance to the humanitarian law 
requirements of distinction and proportionality.  
If killer robots become cheap and easy to obtain or make, then the consequences 
would certainly be bad – as in any case of a weapon becoming more widely available 
(see Müller 2015) – so we would do well to prevent this spread. 
3.3.5. Utility Overall 
So, what is the overall utility count? As usual with utility in the long run, this is very 
hard to say but it seems quite clear that LAWS would do something to reduce the 
human cost of war. Some reduction is extremely valuable, given how serious the suf-
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fering of war is. Further, while LAWS do raise the probability of wars in the short run, 
there is no reason to think they will do so in the long run. The overall utility calcula-
tion depends on the balance of how much less bad wars become and how much more 
likely they become. How bad the short run raise in probability will turn out depends 
mainly on which the first parties to acquire them are. Given current military spend-
ing, we know who these are: USA, China, Russia. It also depends on how big the dif-
ference to remote-controlled systems is, which currently looks minimal. If they do not 
substantially increase the probability of war, then killer robots are good news for hu-
manity.  
4. Conclusions & policy recommendations 
I conclude that: 
1. Killer robots pose no substantial challenge to humanitarian law 
2. Killer robots pose no substantial issue of responsibility 
3. Given 1 and 2, the crucial issue is whether the overall consequences of killer 
robots are positive 
4. The overall consequences of killer robots are probably positive 
5. Therefore, we should not ban killer robots 
Given the caveats in 1, 2 and 4 above, I recommend the following policies (for details, 
see Müller and Simpson 2014): 
6. Develop binding technical standards that spell out manufacturers’ responsi-
bilities 
7. Maintain a clear chain of command and collect data, assuring responsibility 
for actions and enhancing provability of war crimes 
8. Affirm and defend the humanitarian law ‘just war’ requirements, esp. clear 
differences between war and peace, between combatants and civilians (dis-
tinction) and between necessary and unnecessary force (proportionality). 
These requirements are under threat with current remote-controlled weap-
ons, and this threat will continue with LAWS.  
9. Do not ban lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS) or ‘killer robots’ 
 
  
Autonomous Killer Robots Are Probably Good News 14/16 
 
References 
Anderson, Kenneth and Waxman, Matthew (2013), ‘Law and Ethics for Autonomous 
Weapon Systems: Why a Ban Won’t Work and How the Laws of War Can’, 
Stanford University, The Hoover Institution. 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2250126%3E. 
Arkin, Ronald C (2009), Governing lethal behavior in autonomous robots (Boca Raton: CRC 
Press) pp. 
—  (2013), ‘The Robot didn’t do it: A position paper for the Workshop on 
Anticipatory Ethics, Responsibility and Artificial Agents’, 
<http://www.cc.gatech.edu/ai/robot-lab/online-
publications/position_paperv3.pdf%3E. 
Battaglia, Fiorella; Mukerji, Nikil and Nida-Rümelin, Julian (eds.) (2014), Rethinking 
responsibility in science and technology (RoboLaw Series, Pisa: Pisa University 
Press). 216 
Bertolini, Andrea (2014), ‘Robots and liability - Justifying a change in perspective’, in 
Fiorella Battaglia; Nikil Mukerji and Julian Nida-Rümelin (eds.), Rethinking 
responsibility in science and technology (RoboLaw Series; Pisa: Pisa University 
Press), 143-66. 
Birmingham Policy Commission (2014), ‘The security impact of drones: Challenges 
and opportunities for the UK’,  (October 2014). 
<http://www.birmingham.ac.uk/research/impact/policy-
commissions/remote-warfare/index.aspx%3E. 
Emmerson, Ben (2014), ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and 
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering 
terrorism’, UN General Assembly, Human Rights Council, 11 March 2014 
(A/HRC/25/59). 
<http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/HRC/25/59%3E. 
Enemark, Christian (2014), Armed drones and the ethics of war: Military virtue in a post-heroic 
age (War, Conflict and Ethics; London: Routledge) pp. 
European Parliament (2014), ‘Plenary Session: Joint motion for a resolution on the 
use of armed drones ‘, 25.02.2014 [adopted 27.02.2014] (2014/2567(RSP)). 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7
-TA-2014-0172&language=EN%3E. 
Garcia, Denise (2014), ‘The case against killer robots: Why the United States should 
ban them’, Foreign Affairs,  (10.05.2014). 
<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141407/denise-garcia/the-case-
against-killer-robots%3E. 
Gunkel, David and Bryson, Joanna (eds.) (2014), Special Issue on Machine Morality 
(Philosophy & Technology, 27;  
Heyns, Christof (2013), ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary 
or arbitrary executions’, UN General Assembly, Human Rights Council, 23 (3), 
A/HRC/23/47. 
ISS (2014), ‘International Institute for Strategic Studies: The Military Balance 2014 
(Press Statement)’. <http://www.iiss.org/-
/media/Documents/Publications/The Military Balance/MB14 Press 
Statement.pdf%3E. 
Autonomous Killer Robots Are Probably Good News 15/16 
 
Krishnan, Armin (2009), Killer robots: Legality and ethicality of autonomous weapons 
(Aldershot: Ashgate) pp. 
Leveringhaus, Alex and Giacca, Gilles (forthcoming 2014), ‘Robo-Wars: The 
Regulation of Robotic Weapons’, Oxford Martin School Policy Papers. 
Lichocki, Pawel; Kahn, Peter and Billard, Aude (2011), ‘The Ethical Landscape in 
Robotics’, IEEE Robotics and Automation Magazine, 18 (1), 39-50. 
Markoff, John (2010), ‘War Machines: Recruiting Robots for Combat’, The New York 
Times,  (27.11.2010). 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/28/science/28robot.html%3E. 
Ministry of Defense, Chiefs of Staff (2011), ‘The UK approach to unmanned aircraft 
systems’, Joint Doctrine Note, 2/11 (30.03.2011). 
Müller, Vincent C. (2012), ‘Autonomous cognitive systems in real-world 
environments: Less control, more flexibility and better interaction’, Cognitive 
Computation, 4 (3), 212-15. 
—  (2015), ‘Gun control: A European perspective’, Essays in Philosophy, 16 (2), 
247-61. 
Müller, Vincent C. and Simpson, Thomas W (2014), ‘Killer robots: Regulate, don’t 
ban’, University of Oxford, Blavatnik School of Government Policy Memo, November 
2014, 1-4. 
Müller, Vincent C. and Bostrom, Nick (2016), ‘Future progress in artificial 
intelligence: A survey of expert opinion’, in Vincent C. Müller (ed.), 
Fundamental Issues of Artificial Intelligence (Synthese Library; Berlin: Springer). 
Palmerini, Erica, et al. (2014), Guidelines on Regulating Robotics, 22/09/2014 
(http://www.robolaw.eu/) 215 pp. 
Schmitt, Michael N. (2014), ‘A Step in the Wrong Direction: The EU Parliament’s 
Drone Resolution’, Just Security, 07.03.2014. 
<http://justsecurity.org/7926/step-wrong-direction-eu-parliaments-drone-
resolution-schmitt/%3E. 
Sharkey, Noel E (2008a), ‘Computer Science: The ethical frontiers of robotics’, Science, 
322 (5909), 1800-01. 
—  (2008b), ‘Grounds for discrimination: autonomous robot weapons’, RUSI 
Defence Systems, 11 (2), 86–89. 
—  (2012), ‘Automating Warfare: lessons learned from the drones’, Journal of 
Law, Information & Science, 21 (2). 
Simon-Michel, Jean-Hugues (2014), ‘Report of the 2014 informal Meeting of Experts 
on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS)’, High Contracting Parties to 
the Geneva Convention at the United Nations,  (16.04.2014), 1-5. 
Simpson, Thomas W and Müller, Vincent C. (forthcoming), ‘Just war and robots’ 
killings’, The Philosophical Quarterly,  (online 07.08.2015). 
Singer, Peter (2009a), ‘Military robots and the laws of war’, The New Atlantis, Winter 
2009. <http://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/military-robots-and-
the-laws-of-war%3E. 
—  (2009b), Wired for war: The robotics revolution and conflict in the 21st Century (New 
York: Penguin) pp. 
Smalley, David (2014), ‘The future is now: Navy’s autonomous swarmboats can 
overwhelm adversaries’, US Office of Naval Research, 05.10.2014. 




United Nations, General Assembly (2013), ‘Resolution: Protection of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism’, 68/178 (18 
December 2013). http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol 
=A/RES/68/178%3E. 
US Department of Defense (2012), ‘Directive 3000.09, Autonomy in weapon systems’. 
<2014 Killer Robots Policy Paper Final.docx. 
—  (2013), ‘Unmanned Systems Integrated Road Map FY2013-2038’. 
<http://www.defense.gov/pubs/DOD-USRM-2013.pdf%3E. 
 
